PacMan in Iraq (Updated) 0

Those old enough to remember the travesty of the Viet Namese War (and, please note, that term is no reflection on those who served; it is a reflection on those who sent them to serve) remember “body counts.”

As it became clearer that the United States was winning neither territory nor “hearts and minds” (to use the phrase of the time), the United States military was reduced to keeping score by comparing the number of Viet Cong (and reputed Viet Cong and civilians and what have you) with the number of American and South Viet Namese dead.

The body counts were often counts of convenience and frequently slanted to support the favorite U. S.military strategy of the day.

And, as has been frequently noted, the continuing travesty in Iraq has reduced the U. S military to the same strategy, attempting to keep score in Iraq the same way score is kept in PacMan–by the number of dead.

Because, frankly, there are no other signs of progress.

And, as before, the numbers coming from the Current Federal Administration are slanted and shaded to support the favorite U. S military strategy of the day, in the case, the s(pl)urge.

This morning, in a detailed report scathing in its dispassionate factual analysis, NPR’s Morning Edition deconstructed the statistics and revealed how they are being slanted and twisted.

Here’s an excerpt. The full story is worth everyone’s while.

Sometime around February 2004, a top military official in Iraq estimated that there were about 15,000 total insurgents. About a year later, U.S. military leaders in Iraq announced that 15,000 insurgents had been killed or captured in the previous year.

In private, a skeptical military adviser pointed out to commanders that the numbers didn’t make sense. “If all the insurgents were killed,” he asked, “why are they fighting harder than ever?”

Addendum, Later That Same Day:

Atrios has more.